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YOU’VE GOT MAIL, BUT NOT JURISDICTION: 
THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT  
AND THE MAILBOX RULE 
Abstract: The Federal Tort Claims Act provides private individuals with limited 
rights of action against the United States government if plaintiff-claimants meet 
certain jurisdictional requirements. Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) requires 
that plaintiff-claimants present claims to responsible federal agencies before fil-
ing suit in federal court. On March 7, 2019, in Cooke v. United States, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, joining a majority of circuits to 
have considered the question, refused to apply the mailbox rule to the present-
ment requirement in section 2675(a). This Comment argues that the Second Cir-
cuit’s ruling in Cooke is correct because the doctrine of sovereign immunity re-
quires a strict construction that precludes applying the mailbox rule to section 
2675(a)’s presentment requirement. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA or the Act) governs tort actions 
brought against the United States.1 Originally enacted in 1946, the FTCA, by 
making the federal government liable for certain torts that its employees com-
mit,2 creates a limited exception to the United States’ sovereign immunity.3 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended in 
§§ 2671–2680 and in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (2018)). Under the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA or the Act), individuals may seek monetary damages “for injury or loss of property, or person-
al injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Gov-
ernment while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the 
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the 
place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). 
 2 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (waiving liability on behalf of the United States for only some types of 
torts by employees of its government in certain circumstances); see id. § 2671 (defining who qualifies 
as a government employee under the Act). The FTCA holds the United States liable as a private per-
son under the same circumstances, except for pre-judgment interest and punitive damages. Id. § 2674. 
Before the FTCA, individuals had to sue employees of the federal government in their individual 
capacity or petition Congress for relief. See Daniel Shane Read, The Courts’ Difficult Balancing Act 
to Be Fair to Both Plaintiff and Government Under the FTCA’s Administrative Claims Process, 57 
BAYLOR L. REV. 785, 788–90 (2005) (explaining causes of action before the FTCA). 
3 United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813 (1976). The doctrine of sovereign immunity states 
that the sovereign cannot be sued without its consent. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 226 (1882) 
(remarking that consent by the sovereign is a necessary prerequisite for suit against it in any judicial 
forum). The Supreme Court has firmly established the doctrine’s applicability to the United States. 
See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) (“It is axiomatic that the United States may 
not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.”); 14 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR P. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3654 (Helen 
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Section 2675(a) of the Act contains a “presentment requirement,” which re-
quires that parties present their claims to the appropriate “Federal agency” and 
that the agency deny those claims before claimants seek relief in federal court.4 
If claimants do not present their claims in writing either within two years after 
it accrues or within six months of final denial by the agency, then the claims 
are generally barred.5 
Federal regulation explains that a plaintiff satisfies the presentment re-
quirement “when a Federal agency receives from a claimant” written notifica-
tion and a sum certain claim for money damages.6 Further, the receiving agen-
                                                                                                                           
Hershkoff ed., 4th ed. 2015) (noting that this has been an established principle from at least the mid-
eighteen hundreds). Jurists and scholars frequently note that the American doctrine of sovereign im-
munity stems from an English legal principle that the king can do no wrong. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitz-
gerald, 457 U.S. 731, 766 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (noting that, in the United States, sovereign 
immunity has preserved the idea that the king cannot do any wrong); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra, § 
3654 (tracing the doctrine of sovereign immunity to the English legal tradition wherein kings and 
queens were ultimate and infallible legal authorities). Although mostly beyond the scope of this 
Comment, it is worth noting that disagreement exists about the constitutionality and proper interpreta-
tion of the doctrine. Compare Gregory C. Sisk, The Inevitability of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 55 
VILL. L. REV. 899, 922 (2010) (“I do submit that federal sovereign immunity was a natural and com-
mon-sense legal development and is justifiable in a regime of popular sovereignty and a constitutional 
system with separation of powers.”), with DONALD L. DOERNBERG, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OR THE 
RULE OF LAW: THE NEW FEDERALISM’S CHOICE 12 (2005) (“[T]o court and marry both sovereign 
immunity and the rule of law . . . requires . . . comfort[] with an extraordinary degree of cognitive 
dissonance.”), and Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1201–
02 (2001) (arguing that sovereign immunity is “an anachronistic relic and the entire doctrine should be 
eliminated from American law” because it “undermines the basic notion” underlying the American 
government, that is, “the fundamental recognition that the government and government officials can 
do wrong and must be held accountable” (emphasis added)). 
 4 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (conditioning causes of action under the FTCA upon the presentment of 
claims to appropriate agencies and their subsequent denial). In 1966, Congress added this administra-
tive requirement to lessen pressure on the courts and promote the settlement of legitimate claims. See 
McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 111–12 n.7 (1993) (attesting Congress’s rationale and noting 
that the majority of cases before this resulted in pre-trial settlement); Read, supra note 2, at 791–95 
(discussing the adoption and contents of the 1966 Amendments’ mandatory administrative claims 
process); see also Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-506, 80 Stat. 306 (1966). “The term ‘Federal 
agency’ includes the executive departments, the judicial and legislative branches, the military depart-
ments, independent establishments of the United States, and corporations primarily acting as instru-
mentalities or agencies of the United States, but does not include any contractor with the United 
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2671. 
 5 See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (outlining the time limits for commencing action under the FTCA). 
The Supreme Court has held that the time limits under section 2401(b) are not jurisdictional and 
courts can waive them on equitable grounds. United States v. Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 412 (2015). Fur-
ther, “[t]he failure of an agency to make final disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed 
shall, at the option of the claimant any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for pur-
poses of this section.” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). For the purposes of these time limits, tort actions general-
ly accrue at the time a plaintiff’s injury occurs. Flores v. United States, 719 F. App’x 312, 315 (5th 
Cir. 2018) (quoting Trinity Marine Prods., Inc. v. United States, 812 F.3d 481, 487 (5th Cir. 2016)). 
 6 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) (2018) (“For purposes of the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 2401(b), 2672, and 
2675, a claim shall be deemed to have been presented when a Federal agency receives from a claim-
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cy must be the agency “whose activities gave rise to the claim.”7 But courts 
disagree about the proper meaning and interpretation of “receives.”8 In particu-
lar, federal circuit courts are split as to whether the common-law mailbox rule, 
with its accompanying rebuttable presumption of receipt, is applicable to 
FTCA claims.9 
This Comment argues that the mailbox rule should not apply to the 
FTCA’s presentment requirement under section 2675(a).10 Part I of this Com-
ment introduces the mailbox rule and the circuit split over its application to 
FTCA claims, and it examines the most recent federal circuit decision on the 
issue, Cooke v. United States.11 Part II explores the interpretative and policy 
concerns informing this split.12 Part III then considers the majority and minori-
ty positions, as well as the relevant Supreme Court cases, and concludes that 
the mailbox rule does not apply to the FTCA’s presentment requirement.13 
I. THE MAILBOX RULE AND THE FTCA 
The FTCA requires that claimants present their claims to a responsible 
agency and that the agency deny those claims before filing for relief in federal 
court.14 Federal regulation provides that a claim is presented upon the agency’s 
receipt of a claim.15 Courts have disagreed whether the mailbox rule’s pre-
sumption of receipt qualifies as receipt for presentment purposes under the 
FTCA and this applicable regulation.16 Section A of this Part discusses the 
                                                                                                                           
ant, his duly authorized agent or legal representative, an executed Standard Form 95 or other written 
notification of an incident, accompanied by a claim for money damages in a sum certain . . . .”). 
 7 Id. § 14.2(b)(1). 
 8 See, e.g., Vacek v. U.S. Postal Serv., 447 F.3d 1248, 1251–53 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing disa-
greement about the interpretation of “receives” between the circuits). 
 9 See Cooke v. United States, 918 F.3d 77, 81–82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2748 (2019) 
(cataloging courts on each side of the split over whether the mailbox rule applies to FTCA claims). 
Compare Lightfoot v. United States, 564 F.3d 625, 628 (3d Cir. 2009) (refusing to apply the mailbox 
rule to FTCA claims), with Barnett v. Okeechobee Hosp., 283 F.3d 1232, 1238–42 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(applying the mailbox rule to the FTCA’s presentment requirement).  
 10 See infra notes 14–128 and accompanying text (detailing the different rationales for and against 
applying the mailbox rule to FTCA claims and then arguing against its application). See generally 
supra note 4 (providing an overview of the contents and history of the presentment requirement). 
 11 See infra notes 14–45 and accompanying text (providing an overview of both the mailbox rule 
and which courts apply the rule to FTCA claims, as well as the general fact pattern of FTCA cases 
where the rule’s applicability receives discussion). 
 12 See infra notes 46–85 and accompanying text (discussing the rationales behind applying and 
not applying the mailbox rule to FTCA claims). 
 13 See infra notes 86–128 and accompanying text (arguing that courts should not apply the mail-
box rule to FTCA claims). 
 14 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). 
 15 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a). 
 16 See infra notes 23–31 and accompanying text (presenting the federal circuit split concerning 
this issue). 
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background and principles of the mailbox rule.17 Section B provides an over-
view of the circuit split concerning its application to the FTCA’s presentment 
requirement.18 Section C introduces the most recent federal circuit case on this 
issue, Cooke v. United States.19 
A. The Mailbox Rule 
The mailbox rule stems from contract law and provides that a contract of-
fer is deemed accepted once an offeree puts an acceptance in the mail.20 The 
mailbox rule does not consider whether the offeror has actually received the 
acceptance upon mailing; rather, it finds mutual assent to a contract at the mo-
ment an offeree mails an acceptance, regardless of whether it reaches the offe-
ror.21 This mutual assent depends upon a rebuttable presumption of receipt, 
that is, that a properly addressed mailing arrived at its intended destination and 
its addressee received it.22 
B. The Circuit Split 
A majority of circuits to have considered the application of the mailbox 
rule to the FTCA’s presentment requirement—the Second, Third, Fifth, Sev-
enth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth—have refused to apply the rule.23 This camp 
reads “receives” literally to mean that actual receipt of a claim is necessary to 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See infra notes 20–22 and accompanying text (explaining the mailbox rule’s origins and uses). 
 18 See infra notes 23–31 and accompanying text (laying out the disagreement between circuits 
over whether to apply the mailbox rule to the FTCA’s presentment requirement). 
 19 See infra notes 32–45 and accompanying text (providing an overview of the facts, history, 
procedure, ruling, and rationale in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ recent consideration of the 
mailbox rule’s applicability to FTCA claims). 
 20 Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 139 S. Ct. 1048, 1057 (2019) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 66 (AM. LAW INST. 1979)) (citing Rosenthal v. Walker, 111 U.S. 185, 193 
(1884)) (“As first-year law students learn in their course on contracts, there is a presumption that a 
mailed acceptance of an offer is deemed operative when ‘dispatched’ if it is ‘properly addressed.’”); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63. 
 21 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63. 
 22 Rosenthal, 111 U.S. at 193 (“The rule is well settled that if a letter properly directed is proved 
to have been either put into the post-office or delivered to the postman, it is presumed . . . that it 
reached its destination at the regular time, and was received by the person to whom it was ad-
dressed.”); Lupyan v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 761 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing id.) (noting that 
a rebuttable presumption of receipt derives from the mailbox rule). The Supreme Court recognized the 
mailbox rule for the first time in 1884 in Rosenthal v. Walker. 111 U.S. at 193–94; Sorrentino v. IRS, 
383 F.3d 1187, 1189 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that Rosenthal was the first Supreme Court decision to 
recognize the mailbox rule). 
 23 Cooke, 918 F.3d at 81–82 (noting that the majority of circuits have held that the mailbox rule is 
not applicable to FTCA claims and holding the same); Flores, 719 F. App’x at 317 n.1 (“The common 
law mailbox rule is inapplicable to the FTCA . . . .”); see infra notes 24–27 and accompanying text 
(detailing these circuits’ rationales). But see Vacek, 447 F.3d at 1254–55 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(arguing that the Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits’ holdings on the matter are less clear). 
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meet the presentment requirement.24 In other words, mailing does not qualify 
as presenting as it would if the mailbox rule applied.25 Courts on this side of 
the split stress that the doctrine of sovereign immunity compels the construc-
tion of waivers of immunity, such as that contained within the FTCA, as lim-
ited and in favor of the sovereign.26 And, the majority has suggested, equating 
“mailed” with “received” is not a limited construction of the waiver in favor of 
the sovereign.27 
On the contrary, in 2002, in Barnett v. Okeechobee Hospital, the Eleventh 
Circuit held that the mailbox rule is applicable to FTCA claims.28 The Barnett 
court read “receives” more broadly to determine that it contains a rebuttable 
presumption of receipt through the mailbox rule.29 A federal agency, the Bar-
nett court stated, should be treated the same as a private defendant to whom the 
mailbox rule’s accompanying rebuttable presumption of receipt applies.30 The 
Eleventh Circuit is the only federal circuit court to apply the mailbox rule to 
FTCA claims.31 
                                                                                                                           
 24 See Lightfoot, 564 F.3d at 628 (noting that plaintiffs need to show that the appropriate agency 
actually received their claims); Vacek, 447 F.3d at 1252 (refusing to accept that a presumption of 
receipt arises); Bellecourt v. United States, 994 F.2d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that the pre-
sentment requirement was not met when the plaintiff failed to show that the federal agency actually 
received the claim). 
 25 Moya v. United States, 35 F.3d 501, 504 (10th Cir. 1994) (“Mailing . . . is insufficient to satisfy 
the presentment requirement.”); Drazan v. United States, 762 F.2d 56, 58 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Mailing is 
not presenting; there must be receipt.”). 
 26 Cooke, 918 F.3d at 81 (quoting Dep’t of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 261 (1999)) 
(“The Supreme Court has ‘frequently held’ that waivers of sovereign immunity are ‘to be strictly 
construed, in terms of [their] scope, in favor of the sovereign.’”); see infra notes 50–52 and accompa-
nying text (explaining in greater depth the doctrine of sovereign immunity and strict construction). 
 27 See, e.g., Vacek, 447 F.3d at 1252 (“Put simply, it cannot be strict construction of the waiver to 
read the word ‘received’ as actually meaning ‘mailed.’”). 
 28 Barnett v. Okeechobee Hosp., 283 F.3d 1232, 1238–42 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 29 See id. at 1239–40 (“[W]e cannot go so far as to say that affirmative evidence of such receipt is 
required.”). 
 30 Id. at 1240 (“[W]e simply believe that [a federal agency] should not be accorded any special 
presumption of believability because it is a branch of the United States government and should be 
treated no differently than a private defendant . . . .”). 
 31 See Vacek, 447 F.3d at 1252 (observing that the Eleventh Circuit is the only federal circuit 
court that applies the mailbox rule to FTCA claims); Barnett, 283 F.3d at 1238–42 (applying the 
mailbox rule to a claim under the FTCA). In fact, only one court outside of the Eleventh Circuit has 
since found this position persuasive. See Lauren v. United States, No. 14-cv-03040, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 164335, at *24 (D. Colo. Dec. 8, 2015) (invoking the Barnett court’s test for establishing a 
rebuttable presumption of receipt). That court, however, may be in conflict with its own circuit court’s 
position. Compare id. (considering a test for applying a presumption of receipt), with Moya, 35 F.3d at 
504 (refusing to apply the mailbox rule’s presumption of receipt to certified mail where the sender 
does not have the expected return receipt). 
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C. Cooke v. United States: The Second Circuit Joins the Majority 
In 2019, in Cooke v. United States, the Second Circuit joined the majority 
of circuit courts in holding that the mailbox rule is not applicable to FTCA 
claims.32 In Cooke, plaintiff-appellant Jessica Cooke brought a tort claim for 
assault and battery under the FTCA against the United States.33 Cooke alleged 
that, during a traffic stop on May 7, 2015 and without just cause, one Customs 
and Border Patrol (CBP) agent shoved her to the ground and another repeated-
ly shot her with a taser gun.34 
After the alleged incident, on April 1, 2016, Cooke’s counsel incorrectly 
filed a civil rights complaint with the Department of Homeland Security’s Of-
fice of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (DHS-CRCL), instead of the CBP.35 
Cooke’s counsel also mistakenly mailed the requisite Standard Form 95 (SF-
95) to the DHS-CRCL rather than the CBP.36 The DHS-CRCL acknowledged 
receipt of the civil rights complaint in a letter dated June 22, 2016, but it made 
no mention of the SF-95.37 
After inquiring with the DHS-CRCL twice about the civil rights com-
plaint, but not mentioning the SF-95, Cooke filed suit in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of New York.38 The government moved to 
dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that Cooke 
had failed to exhaust the administrative remedies required under the FTCA.39 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See Cooke, 918 F.3d at 80–82; supra notes 23–27 and accompanying text (detailing the circuits 
in this majority and their rationales for not applying the mailbox rule to FTCA claims). 
 33 Cooke v. United States, No. 8:17-CV-224, 2017 WL 5178761, at *1–2 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 
2017), aff’d, 918 F.3d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2748 (2019). Cooke originally pled three 
causes of action, but agreed to the dismissal of the first two “because the United States has not ren-
dered itself liable under the FTCA for constitutional torts.” Id. at *2; see Amended Complaint ¶¶ 27–
35, Cooke, No. 8:17-CV-224 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2017), ECF No. 4; Response to Motion at 10–11, 
Cooke, No. 8:17-CV-224 (N.D.N.Y. June 12, 2017), ECF No. 10; Reply to Response at 8–9, Cooke, 
No. 8:17-CV-224 (N.D.N.Y. July 5, 2017), ECF No. 13. Thus, Cooke’s remaining allegation that the 
government sought to dismiss was against the United States for the assault and battery by United States 
Customs and Border Patrol (CPB) agents under 28 U.S.C. § 2679. Amended Complaint, supra, ¶¶ 31–
35. Section 2679 instructs that plaintiff-claimants can only bring actions under the FTCA against the 
United States, not against the government’s employees or agencies themselves. 28 U.S.C. § 2679. 
 34 Amended Complaint, supra note 33, ¶¶ 21–22.  
 35 Affidavit of Stephen L. Lockwood ¶ 5, Cooke, No. 8:17-CV-224 (N.D.N.Y. June 12, 2017), 
ECF No. 9. Customs and Border Patrol is a federal law enforcement agency under the Department of 
Homeland Security. Id. ¶ 3. 
 36 Id. ¶ 6; see 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) (requiring claimants to mail a completed Standard Form 95 (SF-
95) or its equivalent along with specific monetary claims); id. § 14.2(b)(1) (requiring that claimants 
mail their SF-95s to the agency responsible for the actions giving rise to the claim). 
 37 Cooke, 918 F.3d at 79–80; Affidavit of Stephen L. Lockwood, supra note 35, ¶ 7.  
 38 Cooke, 918 F.3d at 80; Complaint, Cooke, No. 8:17-CV-224 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2017), ECF 
No. 1; Amended Complaint, supra note 33. 
 39 Motion to Dismiss at 4–5, Cooke, No. 8:17-CV-224 (N.D.N.Y. May 16, 2017), ECF No. 8-1; 
see infra note 77 and accompanying text (outlining the jurisdictional nature of the presentment re-
quirement). 
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The government maintained that the appropriate agency never received an SF-
95, a point which Cooke did not dispute.40 The district court granted the gov-
ernment’s motion in explicit accordance with the majority of district courts in 
the Second Circuit, which requires proof of actual receipt by an agency to ful-
fill the presentment requirement.41 On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the 
dismissal of Cooke’s case, and the Supreme Court subsequently denied certio-
rari to further appeal.42 
The material fact pattern in Cooke is straightforward: plaintiff-claimant 
allegedly has sent, but defendant-federal agency allegedly has not received, a 
claim.43 Because plaintiff-claimants only try to invoke the mailbox rule in such 
instances, this general fact pattern is ubiquitous in cases where the applicabil-
ity of the mailbox rule to the FTCA’s presentment requirement is at issue.44 
Therefore, the facts specific to Cooke did not inform the Second Circuit’s an-
swer to the mailbox rule’s applicability nearly as much as how the court de-
fined the meaning of “receives” as a matter of law.45 
                                                                                                                           
 40 Cooke, 918 F.3d at 81; Motion to Dismiss at 4–5, supra note 39; see Declaration of Michael D. 
Bunker, Cooke, No. 8:17-CV-224 (N.D.N.Y. May 16, 2017), ECF No. 8-2 (self-reporting by the rele-
vant regional CBP assistant chief counsel that he found no record of plaintiff-claimant Cooke filing a 
claim with any CBP Counsel office and explaining the CBP claim tracking and review procedures). 
 41 Cooke, 2017 WL 5178761, at *3–5. 
 42 Cooke v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2748 (2019) (Mem.) (denying certiorari); Cooke, 918 F.3d at 
82. 
 43 See Cooke, 918 F.3d at 79–80 (detailing this material dispute); Affidavit of Stephen L. Lock-
wood, supra note 35, ¶¶ 5–7 (same); Motion to Dismiss at 4–5, supra note 39 (same); see also supra 
notes 35–39 and accompanying text (same). 
 44 See, e.g., Lightfoot, 564 F.3d at 626 (noting that the plaintiff allegedly sought agency reconsid-
eration by mail, but the agency had no record of having received the letter); Vacek, 447 F.3d at 1252 
(“Bailey presents virtually identical facts to the case at hand . . . . [C]ounsel did not send the form by 
certified mail . . . [and] did nothing to verify that the claim had been received . . . . [T]he government 
provided affidavits attesting that the claim was never received.”); Moya, 35 F.3d at 502 (noting that 
the plaintiff alleged she mailed a request for reconsideration to the appropriate agency, but the agency 
denied ever receiving such request). But see infra notes 117–119 (discussing pro se prisoners with 
FTCA claims as an exceptional fact pattern). 
 45 See Cooke, 918 F.3d at 80–82 (focusing on the meaning of receipt). The Second Circuit’s two-
page discussion of the issue was a survey of the majority position that focused on the interpretive path 
that the court ultimately chose to follow, rather than the facts of the case. See id. at 82 (“In light of our 
holding that the mailbox rule does not apply to claims under the FTCA, we do not reach the question 
of whether the requirements of the mailbox rule were met in this case.”); see also Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, id., No. 18-1260, 2019 WL 1436685, at *4 (“The Second Circuit squarely held that the 
mailbox rule is inapplicable as a matter of law to FTCA claims and there are no fact-bound disputes 
that might complicate this Court’s review.”). On the other hand, the court devoted only one sentence to 
discussing the minority position, acknowledging two cases where it prevailed. Cooke, 918 F.3d at 81–
82. 
2020] The Federal Tort Claims Act and the Mailbox Rule II.-179 
II. DEFINING THE BOUNDARIES OF RECEIPT 
Section A of this Part discusses the rationale of the majority of circuit 
courts for not applying the mailbox rule in FTCA cases.46 Section B then con-
siders the minority position’s contrary reasoning.47 Finally, Section C explores 
the interpretive and policy concerns of each side in the context of relevant Su-
preme Court cases.48 
A. The Majority Rationales Against Applying the  
Mailbox Rule in FTCA Cases 
The Second Circuit in Cooke v. United States and the majority position re-
fuse to apply the mailbox rule because they believe that it would impermissi-
bly stretch the definition of “received.”49 This camp primarily invokes the sov-
ereign immunity doctrine’s strict construction rule—a practice that ensures 
constructing waivers of sovereign immunity strictly and in favor of the sover-
eign50—as a limiting principle that precludes applying the mailbox rule.51 Ac-
cording to the majority, Congress has only waived the United States’ sovereign 
immunity to claims under the FTCA that a federal agency actually “re-
ceives.”52 From a policy standpoint, these courts stress that claimants are al-
                                                                                                                           
 46 See infra notes 49–53 and accompanying text (detailing the majority of circuit courts’ interpre-
tive and policy reasons for not applying the mailbox rule in FTCA cases). 
 47 See infra notes 54–63 and accompanying text (exploring why the minority of courts applies the 
mailbox rule). 
 48 See infra notes 64–85 and accompanying text (weighing the interpretive and policy narratives 
surrounding analysis of applying the mailbox rule to FTCA claims). 
 49 Cooke v. United States, 918 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2748 (2019) (“The 
statute and corresponding regulation make clear that actual receipt is required . . . .”); see supra notes 
24–25 (citing other cases that agree with this interpretation of actual receipt). 
 50 F.A.A. v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 289 (2012); Dep’t of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 
261 (1999) (“We have frequently held . . . that a waiver of sovereign immunity is to be strictly con-
strued, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign.”); Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) 
(noting that waivers of sovereign immunity meet strict construction in favor of the sovereign); 
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 3654 (noting that a strict construction method does not allow 
looking beyond a statute’s text to, for example, legislative history). 
 51 Cooke, 918 F.3d at 82 (citing Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. at 261) (“[A]pplying the mailbox rule to 
claims under the FTCA would be inconsistent with the principle that waivers of sovereign immunity 
must be strictly construed and limited in scope in favor of the sovereign.”); Lightfoot v. United States, 
564 F.3d 625, 628 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he waiver is limited . . . and is strictly construed in favor of the 
sovereign.” (citation omitted)); Vacek v. U.S. Postal Serv., 447 F.3d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(“Sovereign immunity is an important limitation on the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts.”). 
 52 See Vacek, 447 F.3d at 1252 (“[I]t cannot be strict construction of the waiver to read the word 
‘received’ as actually meaning ‘mailed.’”); Lenius v. United States, No. 2:18-cv-01829, 2019 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 120859, at *6 (W.D. Wash. July 19, 2019) (quoting Vacek, 447 F.3d at 1252) (same); 
Jimenez v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. C-13-2883, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144958, at *8–9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 
7, 2013) (quoting Vacek, 447 F3.d at 1252) (same). 
II.-180 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
ready on notice that they have made claims and have the ability to use certified 
mail to ensure receipt.53 
B. The Minority Rationales for Applying the Mailbox Rule in FTCA Cases 
The minority position, essentially comprised of the Eleventh Circuit’s 
2002 opinion in Barnett v. Okeechobee Hospital and Judge Sidney Thomas’s 
concurrence in the Ninth Circuit case of Vacek v. United States Postal Service 
in 2006, believes that a rebuttable presumption of receipt through the mailbox 
rule fits within the meaning of “receives.”54 This side largely addresses the 
mailbox rule as an evidentiary issue that is either beyond or unchanged by the 
FTCA and necessary to ensure fairness to plaintiffs.55 The Eleventh Circuit did 
not address the doctrine of sovereign immunity and its strict construction rule; 
its interpretive analysis stopped after the evidentiary consideration.56 But 
Judge Thomas seemingly engaged with the doctrine, although not through 
strict construction, because he looked beyond the text to legislative history and 
argued that equitable considerations are compatible with sovereign immunity’s 
requirement of strict construction.57 He advocated that the mailbox rule does 
not expand Congress’s waiver of sovereign immunity because, rather than 
                                                                                                                           
 53 See Vacek, 447 F.3d at 1252 (“It would have taken minimal effort on the part of [Plaintiff’s] 
attorney to verify that the claim had been received: sending it by certified mail.”); Bellecourt v. United 
States, 994 F.2d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 1993) (dismissing an FTCA claim where the plaintiff did not use 
certified mail and the federal agency did not receive any mailing); Bailey v. United States, 642 F.2d 
344, 347 (9th Cir. 1981) (outlining that the plaintiffs and their counsel were naturally aware that there 
was a claim to be received and that certified mail was a simple means of ensuring that receipt). 
 54 See Vacek, 447 F.3d at 1253–57 (Thomas, J., concurring); Barnett v. Okeechobee Hosp., 283 
F.3d 1232, 1238–42 (11th Cir. 2002). In Vacek v. United States Postal Service, Judge Sidney Thomas 
concurred that the plaintiffs-claimants’ case should be dismissed because he agreed that Bailey v. 
United States, forbidding application of the mailbox rule to the FTCA’s presentment requirement, 
controlled. See Vacek, 447 F.3d at 1253 (majority opinion) (citing Bailey, 642 F.2d at 347) (noting 
that Bailey controlled the case at bar and that counsel for the plaintiff conceded as much); id. at 1257 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (pronouncing agreement with the majority opinion that Bailey controlled the 
case at hand). Judge Thomas wrote separately, however, to express his desire to overrule Bailey and 
adopt the reasoning of that case’s dissent to apply the mailbox rule. Id. at 1253–57.  
 55 See Vacek, 447 F.3d at 1256 (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing the mailbox rule as an eviden-
tiary presumption that should apply to FTCA claims because evidentiary standards ought to remain equal 
in cases against private defendants and the government, or else plaintiffs with FTCA claims would suffer 
a material disadvantage on account of evidentiary asymmetry between themselves and the government); 
Barnett, 283 F.3d at 1239 (“We see no reason why we should not . . . allow [plaintiff] the benefit of this 
‘traditional means of weighing evidence in order to determine whether receipt occurred.’” (quoting Konst 
v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 71 F.3d 850, 853 (11th Cir. 1996))). 
 56 See Barnett, 283 F.3d 1232, 1238–40 (noting only that the FTCA is an exception to the United 
States’ general sovereign immunity). 
 57 Vacek, 447 F.3d at 1254–55 (Thomas, J., concurring) (exploring the legislative history of the 
FTCA); id. at 1255–57 (citing Bailey, 642 F.2d at 349 (Jameson, J., dissenting)) (suggesting that the 
FTCA’s partial waiver of sovereign immunity and section 2675’s presentment requirement do not pre-
vent courts from taking equitable factors into account when evaluating the effects of noncompliance with 
jurisdictional, administrative prerequisites). 
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changing the receipt requirement, it merely provides plaintiffs with a chance to 
prove in court that their claims have been received.58 Further, he suggested that 
the mailbox rule is in line with the FTCA’s legislative scheme requiring mini-
mal notice.59 
Notions of fair play also inform the minority position’s belief that the 
mailbox rule should apply to FTCA claims.60 Judge Thomas posited that, be-
cause plaintiff-claimants cannot know what happens inside a government 
agency, allowing litigants to rely upon the mailbox rule’s rebuttable presump-
tion of receipt promotes fair settlement in tort claims against the United 
States.61 With a similar eye toward fairness, the Eleventh Circuit in Barnett 
was concerned that the government had a financial stake in the case as a de-
fendant.62 In that court’s opinion, it was prudent to apply the mailbox rule to 
guard against the harm of potential deceit.63 
C. Competing Narratives of Interpretation and Policy 
Thus, two closely connected sets of competing narratives emerge from the 
federal circuit courts concerning application of the mailbox rule to the FTCA’s 
presentation requirement: the first involves interpretation;64 the second, fair-
ness and administrability.65 For the majority, the sovereign immunity doctrine 
                                                                                                                           
 58 Id. at 1255 (“[A] plaintiff must still prove receipt as the [FTCA] requires, but he may rely on 
the mailbox rule’s rebuttable presumption to do so.”); see supra note 54 and accompanying text (con-
trasting the majority’s position with more of Judge Thomas’s rationale). 
 59 See Vacek, 447 F.3d at 1255 (quoting Shipek v. United States, 752 F.2d 1352, 1354 (9th Cir. 
1985)) (noting that the mailbox rule’s rebuttable presumption of receipt aligns with the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals’ previous interpretation of the presentment requirement in section 2675 as requiring 
minimal notice). Judge Thomas argued that the Ninth Circuit had assumed that the mailbox rule applies 
to FTCA claims and, because the mailbox rule is an established component of federal common law con-
sistent with the FTCA’s statutory scheme, it should be applied. Id. at 1254–55 (quoting Schikore v. 
BankAmerica Supplemental Ret. Plan, 269 F.3d 956, 961 (9th Cir. 2001)); see also ANTONIN SCALIA & 
BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW 318–21 (2012) (providing an overview of the canon of presumption 
against change in the common law and discussing the need for clear changes under the doctrine). 
 60 See infra notes 61–63 and accompanying text (discussing the minority position’s concerns 
regarding fairness for plaintiff-claimants). 
 61 See Vacek, 447 F.3d at 1255 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting S. REP. NO. 89-1327, at 2515–
16 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 2515–16).  
 62 See Barnett, 283 F.3d at 1239–40. Although the Barnett court noted that its own dicta pointed 
against extending the mailbox rule to filings with government agencies, those agencies were not de-
fendants and had no “pecuniary interest” in those instances. Id. (quoting Konst, 71 F.3d at 855). 
 63 See id. at 1240 (noting that it was in the agency’s interest to deny having received the plain-
tiff’s SF-95 and to dismiss the suit). 
 64 See Cooke, 918 F.3d at 82 (focusing upon understanding the meaning of the applicable statute 
and regulation); Barnett, 283 F.3d at 1239–40 (same); see also supra notes 49–52 and accompanying 
text (outlining the majority of circuit courts’ interpretive basis for not applying the mailbox rule to 
FTCA claims); supra notes 54–59 (explaining the minority of circuits courts’ interpretive reasons for 
applying the mailbox rule). 
 65 See Vacek, 447 F.3d at 1252–53 (supplementing interpretive analysis with policy considera-
tions); Barnett, 283 F.3d at 1240 (addressing how equitable considerations shape the court’s under-
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compels a strict construction that precludes applying the mailbox rule to FTCA 
claims and finds support in a common-sense policy where claimants control 
their claims through certified mail.66 For the minority, this strict construction is 
not a part of the central evidentiary considerations that dovetail concerns of 
fairness for adopting the mailbox rule.67 
In deciding whether a waiver of sovereign immunity exists in the first 
place, the Supreme Court demands strict construction of a statute because the 
determination is whether courts have subject-matter jurisdiction.68 Whether a 
statutory condition to a waiver of sovereign immunity also receives strict con-
struction depends upon the condition’s jurisdictional significance.69 If a statu-
tory condition is nonjurisdictional, then a court should not presumptively af-
ford the government the benefit of strict construction in interpreting that condi-
tion.70 But if a statutory condition is jurisdictional, then courts should apply 
                                                                                                                           
standing); see also supra note 53 and accompanying text (detailing the reasons that the majority of 
circuits views applying the mailbox rule to FTCA claims as unfair and not administrable); supra notes 
60–63 and accompanying text (discussing the minority of circuits’ policy reasons for applying the 
mailbox rule to FTCA claims). 
 66 See, e.g., Vacek, 447 F.3d at 1250–53 (noting that the presentment requirement is jurisdictional 
and requires strict interpretation that prevents the court from applying the mailbox rule or saving 
plaintiff-claimants and their counsels from failing to track their claims proactively through certified 
mail); see also supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text (outlining the majority’s position that sov-
ereign immunity requires strict construction in favor of the government, which precludes the mailbox 
rule and supports claimants controlling their claims through certified mail). 
 67 See, e.g., Barnett, 283 F.3d at 1238–40 (holding that plaintiff-claimants litigating against the 
government under the FTCA deserve to have the same evidentiary standards apply to the government 
as would apply to private citizens and noting that to hold otherwise would be prejudicial to claimants); 
see also supra notes 54–63 and accompanying text (detailing the minority’s position that evidentiary 
and policy reasons of consistency and fairness allow application of the mailbox rule to FTCA claims). 
 68 Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. at 261 (“We have frequently held . . . that a waiver of sovereign im-
munity is to be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign.”); Lane, 518 U.S. at 
192 (noting the strict construction in favor of the sovereign in terms of scope that courts give waivers 
of sovereign immunity); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 3654 (providing examples and explana-
tion of the Supreme Court applying strict construction to determine the existence and scope of a waiv-
er of sovereign immunity); Sisk, supra note 3, at 923 (noting that the Supreme Court looks like it will 
continue to use strict construction and presumptions in favor of the government to determine the ex-
istence and basic scope of waivers of sovereign immunity). 
 69 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 3654 (showing that courts treat jurisdictional and non-
jurisdictional conditions differently and detailing examples). Courts should not apply strict construc-
tion in determining whether a statutory condition is jurisdictional. See United States v. Wong, 575 
U.S. 402, 405–12 (2015) (looking beyond the statutory text to determine that time bars attached to a 
statute with explicit waiver of sovereign immunity were not jurisdictional); Irwin v. Dep’t of Veteran 
Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990) (same); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 3654 (noting that the 
Supreme Court did not follow the rule of strict construction in determining jurisdictional conditions in 
United States v. Wong and Irwin v. Department of Veteran Affairs). 
 70 See Wong, 575 U.S. at 405–12 (applying equitable tolling to a statutory condition because the 
Court held that condition to be nonjurisdictional and thus exempt from strict construction). 
2020] The Federal Tort Claims Act and the Mailbox Rule II.-183 
strict construction because concerns about the scope of subject-matter jurisdic-
tion resurface.71 
In 1993, in McNeil v. United States, the Supreme Court interpreted the 
FTCA’s presentment requirement as jurisdictional.72 Then, in 2004, in Kon-
trick v. Ryan, the Court unanimously insisted that jurisdictional is a term ap-
propriate only for rules defining the cases and persons over which a court can 
exercise its power, and “not for claim-processing rules . . . .”73 Since Kontrick, 
the Court has not addressed whether the FTCA’s presentment requirement re-
mains a jurisdictional requirement or if it is now a mere claim-processing rule 
under Kontrick.74 But in 2015, in United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, the Court 
held that the FTCA’s time bars were nonjurisdictional because they were es-
sentially claim-processing rules.75 The dissent, however, vehemently disputed 
the majority’s proclaimed judicial presumption against jurisdictional pins, ar-
guing that courts should uphold such labels where clearly established and fol-
lowed, as it posited the FTCA’s time bars were.76 
All but one of the federal circuit courts to have considered the application 
of the mailbox rule to the presentment requirement have interpreted the re-
quirement as jurisdictional.77 Only the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has 
moved away from this position, concluding that the presentment requirement is 
                                                                                                                           
 71 See id. at 423–28 (Alito, J., dissenting) (refusing to entertain equitable tolling for the same 
because the dissent considered the statutory condition to be jurisdictional and thus requiring a strict 
and limited reading that precluded equitable considerations in favor of plaintiffs rather than the gov-
ernment as sovereign and defendant). 
 72 McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“The FTCA bars claimants from bringing 
suit in federal court until they have exhausted their administrative remedies.”). 
 73 Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004) (noting that courts should use the label “‘jurisdic-
tional’ not for claim-processing rules, but only for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-
matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court’s adjudicatory authori-
ty.”). 
 74 See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text (showing that the Supreme Court’s redefinition 
or clarification of jurisdictional labels in Kontrick v. Ryan succeeded the Court’s classification of 28 
U.S.C. § 2675 as jurisdictional in McNeil v. United States by more than a decade). 
 75 Wong, 575 U.S. at 420; see supra note 5 and accompanying text (explaining that the FTCA 
generally bars claims that a plaintiff-claimant did not bring within two years of accrual or six months 
following agency denial). 
 76 Id. at 428–32 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 77 See Cooke, 918 F.3d at 78 (stating that the FTCA’s presentment requirement is jurisdictional); 
Lightfoot, 564 F.3d at 627 (same); Vacek, 447 F.3d at 1250; id. at 1257 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(same); Staggs v. United States ex rel. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 425 F.3d 881, 885 (10th Cir. 
2005) (same); Barnett, 283 F.3d at 1237, 1242 (same); Bellecourt, 994 F.2d at 430 (same). Addition-
ally, many of these circuit courts have recently reiterated their view that the FTCA’s presentment 
requirement is jurisdictional. See, e.g., Bakhtiari v. Spaulding, 779 F. App’x 129, 132 (3d Cir. 2019) 
(per curiam) (noting the jurisdictional nature of the FTCA’s presentment requirement); D.L. ex rel. 
Junio v. Vassilev, 858 F.3d 1242, 1244 (9th Cir. 2017) (same); Lopez v. United States, 823 F.3d 970, 
976 (10th Cir. 2016) (same); Barber v. United States, 642 F. App’x 411, 413 (5th Cir. 2016) (per 
curiam) (same). 
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more akin to a claim-processing rule than a truly jurisdictional one.78 The Su-
preme Court has repeatedly denied requests for certiorari in cases where courts 
have treated the presentment requirement as jurisdictional and applied strict 
construction.79 
In 1988, in Houston v. Lack, the Supreme Court also applied the mailbox 
rule to a federal statute concerning administrative filing on evidentiary and 
policy grounds.80 In that case, the Court ruled that a pro se prisoner who had 
no control over his administrative filing beyond handing his mail to a prison 
authority deserved the equitable, rebuttable presumption of the mailbox rule.81 
To rule otherwise, the Court stressed, would be poor policy because the prison-
er had no means of ensuring receipt or filing.82 Thus, there was an evidentiary 
imbalance where all parties and persons other than the prisoner himself had 
control over any evidence.83 The Court made clear that this exception for a pro 
se prisoner should not extend to general civil cases.84 Even this extreme exam-
ple and limited exception, however, met strong opposition from a fervent dis-
sent.85 
                                                                                                                           
 78 See Smoke Shop, LLC v. United States, 761 F.3d 779, 786–87 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Kon-
trick, 540 U.S. at 455) (stating that the court was no longer treating section 2675(a) as a jurisdictional 
requirement because it considered that statutory condition more similar to a claim-processing re-
quirement than a condition determinative of the types of cases a court can hear). In Smoke Shop, LLC 
v. United States, the Seventh Circuit still affirmed dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative rem-
edies, stating that constructive notice was not adequate to meet the presentment requirement’s stand-
ards for enabling a settlement process before litigation. Id. at 787–89. 
 79 E.g., Cooke v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2748 (2019) (Mem.) (denying certiorari); Vacek v. 
U.S. Postal Serv., 550 U.S. 906 (2007) (Mem.) (same); Bellecourt v. United States, 510 U.S. 1109 
(1994) (Mem.) (same). A full discussion about the disagreement among the federal circuit courts over 
the jurisdictional significance of administrative requirements like the presentment requirement is be-
yond the scope of this Comment. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 3654 (surveying some disa-
greement among lower courts about whether administrative exhaustion requirements are claims-
processing rules or jurisdictional). 
 80 Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 275–76 (1988) (noting that the general policy that a claimant 
has control over filing with an agency was inapposite where there was an imbalance in access to evi-
dence regarding filing or delay on behalf of a pro se prisoner). In Houston v. Lack, the Court defined 
the time of “filing” a notice of appeal, which was necessary for the plaintiff’s habeas corpus suit under 
28 U.S.C. § 2107 and Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 3(a) and 4(a)(1), as the time at which the 
pro se prisoner-plaintiff delivered his notice of appeal to prison officials. Id. at 272–76. 
 81 Id. at 272–76.  
 82 Id. at 275 (“[P]ro se prisoners necessarily lose control over and contact with their notices of 
appeal . . . at delivery to prison authorities, not receipt by the clerk.”). 
 83 Id. at 276 (“[E]vidence on any of these issues will be hard to come by for the prisoner confined 
to his cell, who can usually only guess whether the prison authorities, the Postal Service, or the court 
clerk is to blame for any delay.”). 
 84 Id. at 274 (noting that the Court’s decision to extend the mailbox rule to filing time for the pro 
se prisoner-plaintiff in Houston should not affect filings in other civil cases, and nor should those 
cases benefit from the application of the mailbox rule to determine filing time). 
 85 See id. at 280–81 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The rationale of today’s decision is that any of vari-
ous theoretically possible meanings of ‘filed with the clerk’ may be adopted—even one as remote as 
‘addressed to the clerk and given to the warden’—depending upon what equity requires . . . . Since 
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III. WHY THE MAILBOX RULE SHOULD NOT APPLY TO FTCA CLAIMS 
Section A of this Part illustrates why the majority’s stance that the mail-
box rule does not apply to the FTCA is most persuasive.86 Section B addresses 
the policy considerations surrounding this debate and how to address them.87 
A. Matters of Law: Jurisdiction and “Receives” 
As a matter of law, the doctrine of sovereign immunity should prevent the 
application of the mailbox rule to the FTCA’s presentment requirement.88 As 
the majority rightly holds, the presentment requirement is a jurisdictional con-
dition, so it must meet strict construction.89 As the regulation explains, a 
claimant fulfills the condition of claim presentation when the appropriate fed-
eral agency “receives” the claim.90 Thus, courts must interpret “receives” 
strictly, which undeniably entails actual receipt.91 
                                                                                                                           
there is no legal warrant for creating a special exception to the rule of receipt for the benefit of incar-
cerated pro se appellants, I cannot join the Court . . . .”). 
 86 See infra notes 88–115 and accompanying text (arguing that the majority’s decision not to 
apply the mailbox rule to FTCA claims is correct in light of the Supreme Court’s instructions regard-
ing strict construction under the sovereign immunity doctrine and addressing the minority position’s 
counterarguments). 
 87 See infra notes 116–128 and accompanying text (suggesting that the policy considerations 
concerning the presentment requirement are important but should not change the interpretation or 
outcome regarding the appropriateness of applying the mailbox rule to FTCA claims). 
 88 See Cooke v. United States, 918 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2748 (2019) 
(citing Dep’t of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 261 (1999)) (“[A]pplying the mailbox rule 
to claims under the FTCA would be inconsistent with the principle that waivers of sovereign immuni-
ty must be strictly construed and limited in scope in favor of the sovereign.”); Lightfoot v. United 
States, 564 F.3d 625, 627–28 (3d Cir. 2009) (considering sovereign immunity as a reason why the 
mailbox rule cannot apply to FTCA claims); Vacek v. U.S. Postal Serv., 447 F.3d 1248, 1252 (9th Cir. 
2006) (noting that sovereign immunity precludes application of the mailbox rule to FTCA claims). 
 89 See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“The FTCA bars claimants from bring-
ing suit in federal court until they have exhausted their administrative remedies.”); Vacek, 447 F.3d at 
1250 (“We have repeatedly held that the exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional in nature and must 
be interpreted strictly . . . .”); supra note 77 (explaining that reading section 2675(a) as jurisdictional 
is the majority position and providing examples of cases). 
 90 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) (2018); Cooke, 918 F.3d at 80–82 (noting that 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) clarifies 
“the contours of the presentment requirement” and focusing on the word choice of “receives” before 
holding that “[t]he statute and corresponding regulation make clear that actual receipt is required” for 
FTCA claims); Vacek, 447 F.3d at 1251 (remarking that the clear language of 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) 
controls and forbids challenges to any actual receipt requirement). 
 91 See Vacek, 447 F.3d at 1252 (“[I]t cannot be strict construction of the waiver to read the word 
‘received’ as actually meaning ‘mailed.’”); supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text (showing that 
strict interpretation is actual receipt); supra notes 71, 77 and accompanying text (outlining the re-
quirement of strict construction to jurisdictional conditions on waivers of sovereign immunity and the 
broad treatment of the presentment requirement as jurisdictional). 
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The minority position’s evidentiary and policy concerns are ultimately 
unconvincing.92 First, because the presentment requirement, as a jurisdictional 
condition, demands a strict construction that requires actual receipt, eviden-
tiary considerations are inapposite.93 Regardless of whether a facial or factual 
attack is levied against plaintiff-claimants’ attempts to meet their burden of 
proving receipt94—and thus, regardless of the truth attributed to plaintiff-
claimants’ allegations—as a matter of law, courts must still interpret “receives” 
as actual receipt.95 This legal standard has created concerns that the govern-
ment can too easily dismiss a claim by lying.96 But pressing upon this concern 
erroneously substitutes policy considerations of fair play for a necessarily an-
tecedent fair interpretation of the law as written and according to the Supreme 
Court’s attendant principles of construction.97 
The Supreme Court’s recent FTCA decision in 2015, United States v. 
Kwai Fun Wong, also suggests that rebuttable presumptions should not apply 
to jurisdictional conditions.98 The majority in Kwai Fun Wong found it appro-
                                                                                                                           
 92 See infra notes 93–115 (asserting that evidentiary and policy concerns have no role in the strict 
interpretation of the FTCA’s presentment requirement that Supreme Court jurisprudence demands). 
 93 See Cooke, 918 F.3d at 80–82 (determining that actual receipt is required and that holding 
otherwise would conflict with the principles of sovereign immunity, which requires courts to interpret 
waivers of sovereign immunity strictly and limited in the sovereign’s favor); Vacek, 447 F.3d at 1252 
(noting that sovereign immunity precludes the Eleventh Circuit’s evidentiary considerations of treat-
ing the government-defendant in an FTCA case like a private citizen in Barnett v. Okeechobee Hospi-
tal); supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text (cataloguing multiple circuits’ similar determinations 
that the FTCA’s presentment requirement demands actual receipt). 
 94 Cooke, 918 F.3d at 80 (explaining that the plaintiff must prove subject matter jurisdiction in-
cluding the fulfillment of pre-suit jurisdictional requirements like the presentment requirement under 
section 2675); Lightfoot, 564 F.3d at 627 (same); see Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 
U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (discussing that federal courts are of limited jurisdiction and the party who ar-
gues that a claim falls within that limited jurisdiction also carries the burden of proving that assertion). 
 95 See 5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR P. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 1350 (3d ed. 2004) (detailing the standards of review for facial and factual attacks to subject matter 
jurisdiction in federal court); see also Barnett v. Okeechobee Hosp., 283 F.3d 1232, 1237–38 (11th 
Cir. 2002) (dealing with standards of review for facial and factual attacks needing resolution). 
 96 See Barnett, 283 F.3d at 1240 (“All that we have said should not imply that we think that the 
VA lied to the district court as to whether it received Barnett’s SF95.”); Davis v. United States, Civ. 
No. 08-184, 2010 WL 3294224, at *7 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 20, 2010) (“The plaintiff casts aspersions on 
two declarations offered by the defendant . . . . Whatever may be the merits of the plaintiff’s criticisms 
of the defendant’s evidence, it is really beside the point.”), vacated, 2010 WL 5014533 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 
3, 2010). 
 97 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 59, at 343–46, 352–54, 364–66 (dispelling notions that (i) 
the spirit of a law or the outcomes that it promotes should influence judicial interpretation of it and (ii) 
that remedial statutes should be liberally construed); infra notes 116–128 and accompanying text 
(discussing policy considerations surrounding the mailbox rule’s applicability to FTCA claims and 
evaluating their significance). 
 98 Compare United States v. Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 411–12 (2015) (majority opinion) (applying 
equitable tolling to the FTCA’s time bars because they considered the condition of time bars as nonju-
risdictional), and Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645–46 (2010) (quoting Irwin v. Dep’t of Veter-
ans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990)) (noting that rebuttable presumptions of equitable tolling are 
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priate to apply a rebuttable presumption because it concluded that the require-
ment was nonjurisdictional.99 Similarly, the minority in Kwai Fun Wong found 
such a rebuttable presumption inappropriate because it determined that the 
time bar was jurisdictional.100 So, although the Court was split 5–4 over 
whether the FTCA’s time bar was jurisdictional, it seemed to agree that rebut-
table presumptions should not apply to jurisdictional provisions.101 
The only way to evade strict construction’s preclusion of the mailbox rule 
would be to determine that the presentment requirement is nonjurisdictional.102 
But even when operating outside of the province of strict construction and 
looking beyond the text of the statute to legislative history and intent, applica-
tion of the mailbox rule still seems inappropriate.103 Judge Thomas suggested 
otherwise, but his argument appears problematic upon examination of the Su-
preme Court’s specific language concerning abrogation, that, where statutes 
                                                                                                                           
generally applicable to nonjurisdictional federal statutes of limitations), with Wong, 575 U.S. at 431–
32 (Alito, J., dissenting) (rejecting the application of equitable tolling to the FTCA’s time bars be-
cause of an understanding that they are jurisdictional). 
 99 Wong, 575 U.S. at 420 (“Congress has supplied no such statement [that the time limits are 
jurisdictional] . . . . Accordingly, we hold that the FTCA’s time bars are nonjurisdictional and subject 
to equitable tolling.” (emphasis added)); see Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004) (noting that 
courts should use “the label ‘jurisdictional’ not for claim-processing rules, but only for prescriptions 
delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) 
falling within a court’s adjudicatory authority”). 
 100 Wong, 575 U.S. at 431–32 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[There is] unmistakable evidence that 
§ 2401(b)’s limits are jurisdictional . . . . [Thus,] I would hold that § 2401(b) does not allow equitable 
tolling.” (emphasis added)). 
 101 See id. at 416–20 (majority opinion) (distinguishing the FTCA’s time bar as nonjurisdictional 
before holding that it is subject to equitable tolling); id. at 431–32 (Alito, J., dissenting) (maintaining 
that the FTCA’s time bar should not be subject to equitable tolling because it is jurisdictional). The 
dissent went further and posited that, even if a condition is nonjurisdictional, it should not be subject 
to a rebuttable presumption where its language clearly stands against such a presumption. Id. at 428 
(“Where Congress imposes an inflexible claims processing rule, it is our duty to enforce the law and 
prohibit equitable tolling, whether it is jurisdictional or not.”). 
 102 See, e.g., id. at 405–12 (majority opinion) (applying equitable tolling to a statutory condition 
because the Court held that condition to be nonjurisdictional); see also supra notes 69–71 and accom-
panying text (discussing when courts will and will not apply strict construction to a statutory condition 
of a waiver of sovereign immunity, which is dependent upon the condition’s jurisdictional status). 
 103 See S. REP. NO. 89-1327, at 2 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 2516 (quoting 
H.R. REP. NO. 89-1532, at 6 (1966)) (“The proposals embodied in H.R. 13650 are intended to ease 
court congestion and avoid unnecessary litigation, while making it possible for the Government to 
expedite the fair settlement of tort claims asserted against the United States.”); H.R. REP. NO. 89-
1532, at 4 (noting an intention for section 2675(a) to require filing claims with an agency before filing 
claims with a court); Medina v. City of Philadelphia, CIV. A. 04-5698, 2005 WL 1124178, at *3 (E.D. 
Pa. May 9, 2005), aff’d, 219 F. App’x 169 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[I]f courts allowed plaintiffs to ‘present’ 
administrative claims by affixing them as exhibits to lawsuits, these goals would be subverted and 
§ 2675(a) would become meaningless.”); see also infra notes 104–115 (arguing that the mailbox rule 
does not seem to fit the presentment requirement even when strict construction’s presumption against 
it is removed because the FTCA contains statutory purposes contrary to that common-law rule). 
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conflict with established common-law principles, courts should favor the latter 
“except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.”104 
The FTCA has three statutory purposes seemingly contrary to the mailbox 
rule.105 First, the Act as a whole is meant to provide a limited waiver of sover-
eign immunity.106 The mailbox rule is contrary to this purpose because it nec-
essarily expands, rather than limits, the United States’ liability under the Act.107 
Second, the FTCA’s 1966 Amendments make it clear that the presentment re-
quirement was enacted to avoid unnecessary litigation.108 The mailbox rule 
also stands against this purpose because it can create litigation that settlement 
                                                                                                                           
 104 United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (emphasis added) (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. 
v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). Compare id. (noting that a longstanding presumption to favor 
established common-law principles applies to statutes that infringe upon the common law unless such 
statutes evidence a contrary purpose), with Vacek, 447 F.3d at 1255 (Thomas, J., concurring) (asserting 
that the mailbox rule is applicable to FTCA claims because it is “consistent with [the Act’s] statutory 
scheme” (emphasis added)). In 1993, in United States v. Texas, the Supreme Court held that the Debt 
Collection Act of 1982 (DCA) did not abrogate the United States’ federal common-law right to collect 
prejudgment interest on debts to it held by the States. 507 U.S. at 539. First, the DCA did not directly 
address the federal government’s common-law right to prejudgment interest collection. Id. at 534–35. 
Second, the Court found no statutory purpose contrary to the federal government’s common-law right to 
collect prejudgment interest from debts held by the State. Id. Only then did the Court consider how the 
DCA’s scheme and legislative history, which showed that the DCA’s purpose was to create measures for 
the federal government to collect debts held by the States, supported their conclusion that the DCA did 
not abrogate the federal government’s common-law right to collect prejudgment interest on state-held 
debts. Id. at 536–37 (citing S. REP. NO. 97-378, at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3378). 
 As the Court noted in Texas, a federal statute abrogates common law when it “speak[s] directly” to 
the issue. Id. at 534. But, the Court explained that “Congress need not affirmatively proscribe the com-
mon law doctrine at issue.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted). Thus, the “speak directly” test requires 
Congress to directly address the issue that the common-law doctrine addresses, not to discuss the doctrine 
itself. See id. The test still lacks clarity, but the Court has said that the bar for abrogation of federal com-
mon law is lower than the clear evidence and Congressional purpose necessary to preempt state law. Am. 
Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 423–24 (2011); see John David Ohlendorf, Against Co-
herence in Statutory Interpretation, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 735, 765 (2014) (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of the “speak directly” test in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut as signifi-
cantly more lenient than a requirement that statutes must directly address discrete issues and calling pro-
nouncements by the court to the contrary “isolated and scattered”). 
 105 See S. REP. NO. 79-1400, at 30–31 (1946) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 79-1287, at 1–3 (1945)) (evi-
dencing the limited nature of suits permitted against the United States under the FTCA); Read, supra 
note 2, at 791–93 (discussing two aims of the 1966 Amendments to the FTCA, to lessen pressure on 
courts and to provide fair settlements to plaintiffs); see also infra notes106–111 and accompanying 
text (outlining the FTCA’s statutory purposes and why the mailbox rule is contrary to each one). 
 106 See S. REP. NO. 79-1400, at 30–31 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 79-1287, at 1–3) (detailing the 
FTCA’s first statutory purpose that is arguably contrary to the mailbox rule). 
 107 See Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 481, 519 
(1996) (“[T]he mailbox rule effectively increases [an addressee’s] exposure . . . .”). 
 108 See S. REP. NO. 89-1327, at 2 (“The proposals embodied in H.R. 13650 are intended to ease 
court congestion and avoid unnecessary litigation, while making it possible for the Government to 
expedite the fair settlement of tort claims asserted against the United States.”); Medina, 2005 WL 
1124178, at *3 (noting that it undermines section 2675(a)’s goals to permit the attachment of claims 
as exhibits in lawsuits instead of requiring presentment to an agency). 
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could render unnecessary.109 Third, the 1966 Amendments intended to promote 
fair settlement opportunities for claimants.110 The mailbox rule also appears 
contrary to promoting fair settlement because it allows claimants to circumvent 
pre-lawsuit settlement discussions.111 Thus, these three statutory purposes con-
trary to the mailbox rule should preclude its application to section 2675(a).112 
Thus, Judge Thomas’s assertion that the mailbox rule is applicable be-
cause it is consistent with the FTCA’s statutory scheme requiring minimal no-
tice is inapposite.113 Further, the legislative history that supports minimal no-
tice in kind does not evidence support of no notice at all.114 Therefore, whether 
one follows the text-only, strict construction approach that sovereign immunity 
                                                                                                                           
 109 See S. REP. NO. 89-1327, at 3 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 89-1532, at 7) (noting that the present-
ment requirement allows agencies to settle meritorious claims in a faster process that avoids the ex-
pense and time that litigation otherwise would require). 
 110 See id. at 2 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 89-1532, at 6) (noting the intention that the presentment 
requirement allow the Government to expedite fair settlement). 
 111 Medina, 2005 WL 1124178, at *3 (noting that it undermines section 2675(a)’s goal of promot-
ing settlement to permit the attachment of claims as exhibits in lawsuits instead of requiring present-
ment to an agency). The natural rejoinder is that a system that makes it arguably easier for agencies to 
lie and cheat plaintiffs out of claims cannot promote fair settlement. See Vacek, 447 F.3d at 1255 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that fair settlement promotion means granting plaintiffs greater 
access to agency inner-workings through the mailbox rule); Barnett, 283 F.3d at 1239–40 (addressing 
the equitable concerns for plaintiff-claimants without the mailbox rule); see also supra note 96 and 
accompanying text (addressing fears of agencies lying). But Congress’s aim in instituting the adminis-
trative requirement of section 2675(a) was specifically to put claims in agencies’ hands to promote 
extra-judicial settlement. See S. REP. NO. 89-1327, at 7 (quoting H. REP. NO. 89-1532, at 4) (com-
menting that the 1966 Amendments’ addition of section 2675(a) requires plaintiffs to submit adminis-
trative claims to agencies). And, of course, plaintiffs are not merely at agencies’ whims because plain-
tiffs have the power of certified mail. See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 642 F.2d 344, 347 (9th Cir. 
1981) (explaining that certified mail is a simple means of ensuring that receipt); see also supra note 
53 (detailing similar arguments that plaintiffs are ultimately in control of receipt). 
 112 See Texas, 507 U.S. at 534 (quotation and citation omitted) (“Congress need not affirmatively 
proscribe the common-law doctrine at issue.”); supra note 104 and accompanying text (explaining that 
a statutory purpose contrary to common-law principles negates the presumption toward retaining the 
latter). 
 113 See Vacek, 447 F.3d at 1254–57 (Thomas, J., concurring) (interpreting the FTCA’s statutory 
scheme and suggesting that it stands for a kind of minimal notice consistent with the mailbox rule). 
Further, Judge Thomas’s citation to his circuit’s interpretation of Congress’s goals in adopting section 
2675(a) in Shipek v. United States undercuts his own notion, because in that case “minimal notice” 
applied only to the content of a received claim. Compare id. at 1255–57 (citing Shipek v. United 
States, 752 F.2d 1352, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985)) (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of section 
2675(a) as requiring minimal notice), with Shipek, 752 F.2d at 1353–54 (analyzing minimal notice as 
the content required in a claim received by a federal agency necessary to put the agency on notice 
under section 2675(a)). 
 114 Compare H.R. REP. NO. 89-1532, at 4 (1966) (emphasis added) (“The new language [in sec-
tion 2675(a)] would require that an administrative claim be filed with an agency or department in each 
instance prior to filing a court action against the United States.”), with Vacek, 447 F.3d at 1254–57 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (claiming that an assumption of the mailbox rule’s applicability is sensible 
because it fits with the 1966 Amendments’ intentions of promoting fair treatment for plaintiffs), and 
id. at 1255, 1257 (citing S. REP. NO. 89-1327, at 7) (identifying a consistent principle of fairness in the 
1966 Amendments and the application of the mailbox rule to FTCA claims). 
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commands or engages with a more expansive interpretation of the FTCA, the 
conclusion is the same: the FTCA precludes application of the mailbox rule to 
claims under the Act.115 
B. Matters of Fact: Policy Implications Are Not the Fact of  
This Matter, But They Matter, in Fact 
The policy considerations that the majority and minority sides of the cir-
cuit split raise regarding the mailbox rule’s applicability are just that: consider-
ations, not reasons to adopt an erroneously loose interpretation of federal regu-
lation.116 Houston v. Lack provides the singular, contrary example where policy 
concerns drove the Supreme Court to apply the mailbox rule to a federal stat-
ute where it otherwise would not have.117 In that case, the Supreme Court de-
cided that application of the mailbox rule was appropriate in the unique cir-
cumstances of a pro se prisoner because he had no way of ensuring receipt of 
his claim.118 The pro se prisoner, of course, differs drastically from the typical 
FTCA claimant with access to certified mail.119 Thus, it is difficult to imagine 
the Supreme Court finding the minority position’s policy considerations to be 
persuasive reasoning for essentially rewriting federal law or regulation.120 Per-
haps this is why the Supreme Court denied certiorari to Vacek v. United States 
Postal Service, despite its record containing the strongest policy argument for 
                                                                                                                           
 115 See Cooke, 918 F.3d at 82 (holding that application of the mailbox rule to FTCA claims would 
be inconsistent with sovereign immunity’s strict construction rule); S. REP. NO. 89-1327, at 2–3 (not-
ing that the 1966 Amendments aim to lessen pressure upon courts and decrease unneeded litigation by 
requiring presentment to agencies before filing claims); see also infra notes 104–115 and accompany-
ing text (arguing that the mailbox rule should not apply to the FTCA’s presentment requirement even 
when strict construction’s presumptions against it are removed, because the FTCA contains statutory 
purposes contrary to that common-law rule). Of course, a reading of section 2675(a) beyond strict 
construction is inappropriate as long the presentment requirement remains jurisdictional. See supra 
notes 68–71 and accompanying text (laying out the appropriate interpretive approaches to different 
questions concerning waivers of sovereign immunity and their different types of attendant conditions 
and showing that strict construction is necessary for jurisdictional conditions like section 2675(a)). 
 116 See Vacek, 447 F.3d at 1253 (quoting Bailey v. United States, 642 F.2d 344, 347 (9th Cir. 
1981)) (“We do not think that we should now stretch and distort the statute and the regulation to res-
cue counsel from their own carelessness.”); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 59, at 343–46, 
352–54, 364–66 (dismissing the idea that courts should liberally construe remedial statutes). 
 117 See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 272–76 (1988) (explaining the Court’s application of the 
mailbox rule as an exception on account of unique policy grounds). 
 118 See id. at 275–76 (remarking that pro se prisoners have no control over their notices once they 
hand them over to prison authorities and that this creates an evidence asymmetry for the pro se “pris-
oner confined to his cell, who can usually only guess” who is responsible for any delay). 
 119 See id. at 274 (noting that this exception for a pro se prisoner should not be extended to gen-
eral civil cases); Vacek, 447 F.3d at 1252 (observing that it is simple for most plaintiffs to use certified 
mail to ensure receipt); Bailey, 642 F.2d at 347 (same). 
 120 See Vacek, 447 F.3d at 1252 (quoting Library of Cong. v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 318 (1986)) 
(expressing near disbelief at the Eleventh Circuit’s rationale and claiming that that circuit’s decision is 
“contrary to the law of the Supreme Court”).  
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doing so in Judge Thomas’s concurrence, notably signed onto by two-thirds of 
the circuit panel.121 
Although this Comment cannot endorse Judge Thomas’s or the Eleventh 
Circuit’s positions, the consequences of certain outcomes under the current 
state of law are not trivial.122 Vacek itself provides a striking example that 
Judge Thomas put well: “[The plaintiff] was first struck by a Post Office truck, 
and then had his damage claim stamped out because the Post Office lost it in 
the mail.”123 Scenarios like this raise questions about the justice of sovereign 
immunity and the letter of the law.124 Appreciating the entrenched and expan-
sive scope of that doctrine,125 the most practical solution to help plaintiff-
claimants would be agency regulation specifying appropriate mailing proce-
dures.126 Until then, practitioners are advised to use methods of delivery that 
confirm receipt.127 Although it is certainly possible that the Supreme Court 
could at some point open the door to the mailbox rule by refusing to afford 
                                                                                                                           
 121 Vacek v. U.S. Postal Serv., 550 U.S. 906 (2007) (Mem.) (denying certiorari); see Vacek, 447 
F.3d at 1256–57 (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing notions of fair play surrounding the presentment 
requirement and how the mailbox rule could provide plaintiffs with a level playing field). 
 122 See Vacek, 447 F.3d at 1253 (Thomas, J., concurring) (detailing how refusal to apply the mail-
box rule to a plaintiff’s FTCA claim meant that the plaintiff could not seek relief in federal court for 
his injuries resulting from a mail truck hitting him). This is not the only area of the FTCA to rightfully 
receive criticism for its exclusion of meritorious claims. See, e.g., Andrew F. Popper, Rethinking 
Feres: Granting Access to Justice for Service Members, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1491, 1500 (2019) (arguing 
that Congress and the Supreme Court should overrule Feres v. United States and amend the FTCA to 
allow service members to seek damages in federal court for civil torts). In 1950, in Feres v. United 
States, the Supreme Court held that the FTCA does not give military service members the ability to 
sue the federal government for injuries arising out of, or incurred in the course of, activities “incident 
to service.” 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). It remains unclear what harms the “incident to service” bar 
prohibits relief for, but it has gradually broadened to bar service members from relief for injury arising 
from “medical malpractice, exposure to toxic substances, murders or suicides, sexual assault, and 
more.” Popper, supra, at 1504–14. Where such harms involve nothing “essential to military service,” 
service members should have the same rights of action under the FTCA as private citizens. See id. at 
1540–43 (arguing in favor of overruling Feres and amending the FTCA to specify causes of action 
that are not incident to, or essential for, military service, such as rape or gross medical malpractice). 
 123 Vacek, 447 F.3d at 1253 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 124 See id. (detailing a tragically ironic scenario). See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 3 (mak-
ing a case for the unconstitutionality and abolishment of sovereign immunity). 
 125 Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 1201–02 (remarking that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is 
“not fading from American jurisprudence; quite the contrary, the Supreme Court is dramatically ex-
panding its scope”); Helen Hershkoff, 39 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 243, 257 (2015) (“[N]o principle is 
more entrenched in American law than that of sovereign immunity. . . .”). 
 126 See Philip N. Jones, Circuits Split Over the Mailbox Rule, but IRS Issues a Fix, 115 J. TAX’N 
278, 284–85 (2011) (discussing how the IRS promulgated regulation to eliminate confusion over 
whether the mailbox rule was available for filers in light of statutory mailing rules by clarifying that 
the statutory scheme supplanted the mailbox rule). 
 127 See supra note 53 and accompanying text (detailing the majority of circuits’ expectation that 
counsel complete such steps). 
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administrative exhaustion conditions like the presentment requirement jurisdic-
tional status, that time has not come.128 
CONCLUSION 
With deference to current interpretative instructions from the Supreme 
Court concerning sovereign immunity’s strict construction rules, it seems that 
the mailbox rule should not apply to FTCA claims. The jurisdictional nature 
currently widely attributed to the presentment requirement especially supports 
this view, but refusal to apply the mailbox rule seems appropriate even when 
moving past the limits of strict construction. Therefore, the Second Circuit 
made the precedentially sound decision in Cooke v. United States by joining 
the majority side of this debate and refusing to apply the mailbox rule to the 
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 128 See, e.g., Cooke v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2748 (2019) (Mem.) (denying certiorari); Vacek 
v. U.S. Postal Serv., 550 U.S. 906 (2007) (Mem.) (same); Bellecourt v. United States, 510 U.S. 1109 
(1994) (Mem.) (same). 
